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The risk of over-reliance on external credit ratings by investors and market participants was 
highlighted in the context of the recent post-crisis credit rating agencies’ reforms. This problem stems 
from the inclusion of credit ratings into legislation. Accordingly, regulators agreed upon an approach 
based on a review of the credit rating references found in legislation and regulatory frameworks. At 
the EU level, this approach has been set out in the European regulation of CRAs. This paper aims to 
investigate the hardwiring of credit ratings into the EU’s financial legislation in order to assess the 
extent to which this poses a significant risk of over-reliance. The present analysis relies on the 
outcomes of the recent joint report that the European supervisory authorities has issued with regard 
to the risk of over-reliance on credit ratings in their own recommendations, guidelines and draft 
technical standards. These can form the platform for a wider discussion on the degree of importance 




Credit ratings are important tools for evaluating the creditworthiness of borrowers such as 
corporations, sovereign governments and municipalities. Their viability to reduce information 
asymmetries and transaction costs between issuers of debt instruments and investors has made them 
widely used by the private and public sectors. As a result, the credit rating agencies (CRAs) have 
been given a prominent position in the financial markets.1 At the EU level, before the 2007-2009 
financial crisis, three European directives referring to CRAs, namely the Market Abuse Directive 
(MAD), the Capital Requirement Directive (CRD) and the Market in Financial Instrument Directive 
(MIFID), along with the set of best practices elaborated by the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissioners (IOSCO Code), were considered a robust enough framework to deal with the rating 
sector.2  
 However, after the financial crisis the European stance towards this self-regulation model 
went into reverse. The crisis triggered worldwide government bail-outs and the granting of credit 
guarantees to large banks and financial institutions, which were on the brink of collapse in the wake 
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of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy.3 In this context, the European regulators started to rethink their 
previous regulatory approaches and the rating sector was earmarked to be the first to receive such 
attention because of the role played by the CRAs.4 The abovementioned directives were no longer 
considered a sufficient regulatory framework for CRAs and the IOSCO Code was regarded as a 
‘toothless wonder’ to discipline CRAs.5 The pace of reform was very fast and resulted in three 
regulations issued between 2009 and 2013. The last piece of legislation, Regulation No 462/2013 
(CRA Regulation III), improved upon the earlier legislation by revisiting the rules on conflict of 
interest, structured finance and sovereign ratings and by setting out a civil liability regime for CRAs.6  
 Within this body of rules, three provisions dealing with the risk of ‘sole or mechanistic 
reliance’ on credit ratings by investors and market participants appear to be the odd ones out. Indeed, 
these provisions are not concerned with the structure and operation of the rating industry but with the 
investors’ and market participants’ approach to credit ratings. Significantly, they address the 
possibility that references to credit ratings in legislation and regulatory frameworks can be interpreted 
as ‘official seals of approval’ of creditworthiness imprinted by the regulators. Consequently, the 
investors and market participants would neglect their own due diligence and credit risk assessment 
by using the credit ratings as exclusive benchmarks for assessing the credit risk. In a word, these rules 
refer to the phenomenon of over-reliance on external credit ratings that the post-crisis regulatory 
debate on the CRAs exposed among other issues. In light of this risk, under Article 5(b) of CRA 
Regulation III the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB) are required to complete a review of the credit rating references in their recommendations, 
guidelines and draft technical standards to identify and remove those references to credit ratings 
which can trigger sole or mechanistic reliance on credit ratings. At the same time, this review and 
removal approach is intertwined with Article 5(a) which encourages investors and market participants 
to perform a more independent credit risk analysis and not to rely solely or mechanistically on credit 
ratings. In the first half of 2014, the ESAs issued the results of their review work. These stimulate 
numerous reflections in relation to the same review work that the Commission is mandated to 
complete by 2020 as to the credit rating references in EU law.7  
 This paper analyses the extent to which credit rating references in EU law carry the risk of 
inducing mechanistic reliance by investors and market participants. By critically reviewing the work 
of the ESAs, and discussing the future Commission’s review of the EU’s financial legislation, this 
paper will seek to answer the question of whether the references to credit ratings in EU law carry an 
effective risk of over-reliance. Such an analysis requires, firstly, a clarification of the phenomenon of 
over-reliance on external credit ratings; secondly, an illustration of the European rules which have 
been laid down to tackle this phenomenon; and thirdly, scrutiny of the current status of their 
implementation in accordance with the timeframe set out in CRA Regulation III. Specifically, the 
analysis is not centred on the feasibility of the European approaches to eliminate over-reliance, but 
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on investigating the degree of importance that the European regulators gave to credit ratings in the 
EU’s financial legislation.  
 Accordingly, the remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The second section 
introduces the phenomenon of over-reliance and explains it in relation to the two different contexts 
in which it may arise, namely: the hardwiring of credit ratings into legislation and regulatory 
frameworks and the structured finance sector. The third section will provide an exegesis of the EU 
rules against over-reliance by regarding them as the full endorsement of the soft-law principles 
elaborated, at the international level, by the Financial Stability Board (FSB). The third section will 
assess the degree of implementation of the rules incorporated into CRA Regulation III by critically 
analysing the outcomes of the ESAs’ review. The fourth section will discuss the work that the 
Commission will complete by 2020. In this respect, an analysis of the role of credit ratings in the 
main pieces of EU’s financial legislation will cast light on the potential risk of over-reliance. This 
will permit us to draw a conclusion on the use that the European regulators have made of the credit 
ratings in their legislation and whether this may increase the risk of over-reliance.  
 
 
2. Defining Over-reliance on External Credit Ratings 
 
Following the dramatic events of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, regulators and policymakers tried to 
identify opportune regulatory measures to restore financial stability worldwide. In its 2008 report on 
enhancing market and institutional resilience, the FSB, among other things, warned investors and 
market participants to avoid over-relying on external credit ratings.8 Specifically, the FSB underlined 
that some institutional investors depended heavily on credit ratings in their investment guidelines and 
choices. This had the effect of giving credit ratings the role of exclusive benchmarks for the 
assessment of credit risk to the detriment of a complementary, and independent, credit risk assessment 
and due diligence.9 The FSB identified the source of this specific problem in the embedding of credit 
ratings in regulatory and legislative frameworks at the international and national levels. In other 
words, the FSB warned against the risk that investors and market participants might perceive the 
legislative requirements to invest in highly rated products as guarantees of creditworthiness. As a 
result, they would not perform their own due diligence and credit risk assessment in addition to the 
credit quality analysis provided by the CRAs. Over-reliance was not, however, exclusively traced 
back to the hardwiring of credit ratings into legislation and the regulatory frameworks. The FSB 
report stated that over-reliance on credit ratings was also particularly acute in the structured finance 
sector during the years leading up to the recent financial crisis.10 With regard to the structured finance 
sector, it is commonly acknowledged that investors misunderstood the specificities and limits of the 
structured finance ratings. In essence, they wrongly assumed that the ratings assigned to structured 
products such as Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBSs) and Collateralised Debt 
Obligations (CDOs) covered the market risk and liquidity risk in addition to the credit risk.11 There 
are clearly two contexts in which over-reliance may occur. Significantly, the FSB introduced the 
problem of over-reliance on external credit ratings without providing a specific definition of it. The 
FSB only indicated who may over-rely, that is, investors and market participants, and the contexts in 
which the phenomenon may arise. There is therefore a definitional gap which needs to be closed. 
Indeed, over-reliance is addressed through different regulatory approaches according on whether it 
stems from the rating-based regulation or the structured finance sector. This confirms that there are 
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two types of over-reliance. Thus, it is worth providing a clearer understanding of them through the 
elaboration of a specific definition.  
 As to the structured finance sector, at the EU level the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators (CESR) summarised the investors’ risk analysis approach to the sophisticated structured 
finance products as follows: ‘it’s [the structured product] AAA rated so it’s safe, valuable and 
liquid’.12 Undoubtedly, the investment grade ratings assigned by the CRAs to such products were 
interpreted as a guarantee of creditworthiness. As a result, investors did not perform any independent, 
complementary analysis. This raises the question of how this assumption could take place. According 
to the IOSCO, this happened ‘either because they were lax or ignorant’.13  
 These two adjectives, ‘lax or ignorant’, are the basis for drawing a comparison between the 
phenomenon of over-reliance in the context of the rating-based regulation and in the context of the 
structured finance sector. Interpreting them literally, while the former refers to a lack of care, attention 
or control, the latter denotes a lack of knowledge, understanding or information about something. 
Placing these meanings in the context of over-reliance, it can be argued that laxity pertains more to 
the over-reliance arising from the rating-based regulation, whereas ignorance characterises the over-
reliance present in the structured finance sector. In the rating-based regulation context, over-reliance 
is ascribed to the investor’s laxness in respect of undertaking her own due diligence and credit risk 
assessment. This is due to a misperception of the role assigned by regulators to credit ratings in 
legislation. Generally speaking, the ‘seal of approval’ interpretation does not necessarily imply 
ignorance of the characteristics and limits of the products or, above all, of the credit ratings. Market 
participants who invest in highly rated products under legislative requirements may be aware of the 
limits of credit ratings; especially if they invest in those debt instruments whose risk characteristics 
may be gauged more easily than a complex, highly sophisticated, structured product. From an over-
reliance perspective, they would not say, ‘it’s AAA rated so it’s safe, valuable and liquid’. Instead, 
they might say, ‘it’s AAA rated and this is required by regulators; hence, I am safe and sound and 
nothing else is needed’. This reasoning does not necessarily overestimate the limits of credit ratings; 
but it leads them to neglect their own due diligence and fail to undertake a credit risk assessment 
which should be done in addition to, or as a complement to, the risk analysis provided by the CRAs. 
In essence, they are not incentivised to undertake their own credit risk assessment, even though they 
may have the capacity and possibility of doing so.  
 By contrast, in the structured finance sector, if they do not have a clear understanding of the 
products and of the specificities of their credit ratings, they will not have the capacity or the possibility 
of conducting their own due diligence and credit risk assessment. A lack of understanding of the 
products that an investor would like to buy, means not knowing its features and risk characteristics; 
in turn, not knowing the financial product to be purchased implies ignorance. This ignorance may 
ultimately lead to a mischaracterisation of the limits of the credit ratings as occurred before the 
outbreak of the recent financial crisis. Clearly, in the structured finance sector, these problems stem 
from the lack of awareness of the necessary information whether on the characteristics of the 
structured products or on the specificities of the credit ratings assigned to them. Importantly, 
increasing the level of the investors’ understanding of the characteristics of the structured finance 
ratings through more disclosure on the part of the CRAs is part of the current regulatory strategies to 
reduce over-reliance in the structured finance sector in the EU14 and the US.15 This goes hand-in-
hand with more disclosure on the characteristics of the structured finance products by the issuers. 
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Indeed, the higher the level of sophistication of the structured finance products, the greater the risk 
that the purchasers will not have a clear understanding of them. This, in turn, will increase their 
ignorance and raise the risk that they may perceive a triple A as a guarantee of good investments. In 
this context, their over-reliance on credit ratings seems to be the natural result of their lack of 
necessary information. Therefore, a lack of their own due diligence and credit risk assessment is not 
a matter of laxness, but a matter of impossibility because of a lack of necessary information. In light 
of this discussion, a line of demarcation can be finally drawn between the two types of over-reliance: 
the first stems from the use of credit ratings by the public sector; and the second relates to the 
structured finance sector. In the first area, over-reliance is the investors’ and market participants’ 
misunderstanding of the role of credit ratings in financial regulation which finally leads them to be 
negligent in conducting their own credit risk assessment. In the second area, over-reliance originates 
from the lack of necessary information on the products and their ratings. This makes investors unable 
to undertake their own due diligence and credit risk assessment and may lead them to rely exclusively 
on credit ratings for the assessment of credit risk. In this context credit ratings are not the ‘seal of 
approval’ of creditworthiness by regulators, but the ‘seal of creditworthiness’ by CRAs.  
 Having distinguished two areas which carry the risk of over-reliance, it is possible to 
summarise the result of the present analysis into a definition of over-reliance and, thus, close the 
definitional gap in the FSB report. Over-reliance on external credit ratings is a behavioural 
phenomenon which may originate from two contexts, that is, the rating-based regulation and the 
structured finance context. Within the hardwiring of credit ratings in financial legislation, over-
reliance is the misperception of the roles of credit ratings in legislation and regulatory frameworks. 
This misperception results in the investors’ and market participants’ laxness in conducting their own 
due diligence and credit risk assessment. In the structured finance sector, over-reliance is the 
mischaracterisation of the nature and limits of the credit ratings. This depends on the impossibility of 
conducting one’s own due diligence and credit risk assessment due to a lack of necessary information 
on the products and their ratings. 
 
3. The European Approach Against Over-reliance on External Credit Ratings 
 
3.1. International sources: the FSB two-pronged approach  
 
Within the context of over-reliance deriving from the rating-based regulation, the FSB encouraged 
authorities to check the role they assigned to credit ratings in their regulations and supervisory rules. 
The FSB underlined that credit rating references should not facilitate undue reliance on credit ratings 
and should be consistent with the aim of having investors perform an autonomous judgement of risks 
and proper due diligence. 16 The authorities’ task was hence concerned with reviewing whether 
investment grade rating requirements in regulations and supervisory policies could be perceived by 
investors and market participants as an official recognition of creditworthiness; and, for this reason, 
act as a disincentive to perform additional due diligence and credit risk assessments.17 To this end, in 
2010 the FSB issued a set of principles to reduce reliance on credit ratings.18 These principles are the 
source on which the current European rules against over-reliance are based.  
 Before detailing the European approaches, some considerations are necessary to clarify how 
over-reliance is addressed in the FSB principles. The set of principles is, in fact, entitled ‘Principles 
for Reducing Reliance on Credit Ratings’ and not ‘Principles for Reducing Over-reliance on Credit 
Ratings’. In light of this, it must be assessed whether there is an explicit or implicit reference to over-
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reliance so that the set of principles can be regarded as fixing the approach to tackle over-reliance on 
external credit ratings. In this respect, it is desirable to analyse the purpose and contents of the FSB 
recommendations. To start with, in the explanatory notes, the FSB refers to the need to reduce the 
cliff-edge effects associated with rating downgrades and the potential for herd-behaviour. Whereas 
the first refers to a dramatic sale of debt instruments whose credit rating has been downgraded below 
a certain threshold, the second refers to the possibility that other investors may behave in the same 
fashion without rationality.19  
 Both cliff-edge effects and herd behaviour are exacerbated by ‘mechanistic reliance on credit 
ratings’ which, in turn, is facilitated by the hardwiring of credit ratings in legislation and regulatory 
frameworks. Clearly, the FSB replaced the word over-reliance with a specific one: ‘mechanistic 
reliance’. However, no definition was provided by the FSB. Nonetheless, by reflecting upon the 
context that the FSB set out to introduce its principles, it can be noted that over-reliance and 
mechanistic reliance may be used as synonyms. A practical example will help clarify this assertion. 
For instance, where asset managers are required by law to hold in their portfolio debt instruments 
rated investment grade, in the event of downgrades they may start selling them. In parallel, others 
may behave in the same manner. Significantly, this is an example of reactions which are 
mechanistically triggered by the rating downgrades and facilitated by a legislative requirement to 
invest in highly rated debt instruments. These phenomena arise when credit ratings are taken at face 
value with no complementary, independent analysis; put simply, when investors overly rely on credit 
ratings to the extent that they become the primary and exclusive benchmarks to assess 
creditworthiness. Consequently, mechanistic reliance and over-reliance can be used to define the 
same issue: a problem of investors’ best practice which may originate from the use of credit ratings 
in legislation. To cease or reduce this potential, it is necessary to intervene first at the source of the 
risk, namely, through the rating-based regulation. This implies stopping regulators from including 
credit ratings in financial regulations. Indeed, this strategy is the rationale behind the first of the 
principles promoted by the FSB. According to FSB Principle I, standard setters, regulators and 
policymakers are required to review references to credit ratings in their standards and regulations and, 
where appropriate, replace them with alternative standards of creditworthiness.20 FSB Principle I is 
regarded as the first level of the approach elaborated by the FSB. Basically, the overall approach is a 
strategy to be put into practice through two intertwined levels. The first level is incorporated in FSB 
Principle I and the second in FSB Principle II.21  
 The second principle requires investors and market participants to undertake their own credit 
risk assessment and due diligence and not to rely solely or mechanistically on credit ratings.22 The 
connection between the two levels of the FSB approach is apparent in the fact that the second level 
can be implemented consequently to the development of the first level: once credit rating references 
are removed and replaced by alternative standards of creditworthiness, investors and market 
participants will be more independent from the credit ratings and will prioritise their own due 
diligence and credit assessment.23 Based on this, it can be claimed that FSB Principle II is the 
provision targeting over-reliance by the investors and market participants. In other words, over-
reliance stems from the hardwiring, but it is finally materialised through the conduct of investors and 
market participants. Therefore, FSB Principle II is needed to encourage an independent more 
autonomous credit risk analysis in addition to the first principle which requires regulators and 
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standard setters to reduce the amount of credit rating references in their legislation and regulatory 
frameworks. The two-pronged approach involves all the principal actors and users of external credit 
ratings in the financial markets: from large, sophisticated, financial institutions, including central 
banks, to smaller, less sophisticated financial firms as well as investment managers who have 
mandates to invest in highly rated financial products. Importantly, the FSB Principles represent an 
approach to eliminate the investors’ and market participants’ over-reliance through the reduction of 
the regulators’ reliance on credit ratings. This assertion can be finally confirmed by examining the 
contents of the over-reliance rules incorporated in the European legislation on CRAs. 
 
3.2.Over-reliance under the European regulation of CRAs 
 
By looking at the three pieces of European legislation on CRAs it is apparent that the European 
regulators took the problem of over-reliance into consideration as initially encouraged by the FSB. 
Regulation No 1060/2009 (CRA Regulation I) did not include any specific provision on over-reliance, 
only a reference under Recital No 10 in which it is stated that investors should not excessively rely 
on credit ratings and should instead perform their own credit risk assessment and due diligence.24 
However, CRA Regulation I was the stepping-stone towards the current broader regulation 
encompassing all the issues that had initially been left out. These are: sovereign rating methodologies, 
CRAs’ civil liability and disclosure requirements with regard to the rating of structured finance 
products.25 Over-reliance on external credit ratings was included as well.26 It can be observed that the 
consultations and preparatory works leading to the drafting of CRA Regulation III reflected a full 
endorsement of the Principles that the FSB had issued. In particular, from the impact assessment 
study of the third piece of the CRA legislation, it can be seen that the aim was to pursue a strategy 
conforming to the set of principles.27 Finally, the transposition of the FSB two-pronged approach can 
be found in Articles 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c) of CRA Regulation III. Both Articles 5(b) and 5(c) implement 
FSB Principle I. By analysing them separately, Article 5(b) of CRA Regulation III requires the ESAs, 
namely the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Securities Market Authority (ESMA) 
and the European Insurance and Occupational Pension Authority (EIOPA) not to refer to credit 
ratings in their guidelines, recommendations and draft technical standards where these references 
carry the potential to trigger sole or mechanistic reliance on credit ratings by authorities and market 
participants. Furthermore, the rule requests that the concerned authorities review and remove, where 
appropriate, all such references to credit ratings in their existing guidelines, recommendations and 
draft technical standards. 28  Unquestionably, this rule mirrors the contents of FSB Principle I. 
Similarly, Article 5(c) tasks the Commission with monitoring whether credit rating references in EU 
law can trigger a ‘sole or mechanistic reliance’ on credit ratings by financial authorities, investors 
and market participants. As the Article specifies further, the purpose is to delete such references by 
                                                          
24 See Recital No 10 of Regulation 1060/2009, 2009 OJ (L 302): ‘The users of credit ratings should not rely 
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investment firms should be encouraged to put in place internal procedures in order to make their own credit 
risk assessment and should encourage investors to perform a due diligence exercise’. 
27 Commission, Impact Assessment Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council Amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies 
SEC(2010)COM, 678 (2010). 
28 Art 5(b) of CRA Regulation III; see also Recital No 3 of CRA Regulation III in which the endorsement of 
the FSB Principles and Recital No 5 in which central banks are encouraged, in line with the FSB Principles, 
to reach their own credit judgment on the financial instruments they may accept both as collateral and as 
outright purchases is remarked. 
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2020 once appropriate alternatives have been found.29 This rule is entitled ‘Over-reliance in the EU 
Law’. On the one hand, it mirrors the contents of FSB Principle I as to the review and removal process 
that the Commission is required to complete by 2020. On the other hand, it is entitled ‘over-reliance’ 
and the words ‘sole and mechanistic reliance’ appear in its text. This confirms the initial assertion 
that over-reliance and mechanistic reliance can be used as interchangeable terms. They both apply to 
the investors’ and market participants’ practice of giving exclusivity to the credit ratings as tools for 
assessing the creditworthiness of debt instruments. This jeopardises their capability to perform an 
independent credit risk analysis and reduces the possibility of considering other factors as alternatives 
to the credit ratings for measuring creditworthiness. Finally, the transposition of FSB Principle II can 
be identified in Article 5(a). This rule is entitled ‘Over-reliance on Credit Ratings by Financial 
Institutions’ and requires financial institutions to make their own credit quality assessment and not 
solely and mechanistically rely on credit ratings.30 Article 5(a) of CRA Regulation III gives credence 
to the assertion that FSB Principle II refers to and has to be regarded as the approach set out at the 
international level to tackle the problem of over-reliance as it applies to the investors’ and market 
participants’ approach to credit ratings.  
 The full integration of the FSB approach into post-crisis EU legislation can also be seen out 
of the context of the specific legislation of CRAs. For instance, Directive 2013/14/EU, issued in May 
2013, has amended the European directives on the activities and supervision of institutions for 
occupational retirement provision (IORP Directive), on the regulation of undertakings for collective 
investment in transferable securities (UCITS Directive) and on alternative investment fund managers 
(AIFM Directive).31 Amendments were applied with respect to over-reliance on credit ratings and, 
again, they reflect the FSB Principles to the extent that in order to improve the quality of investments 
made by IORPs, UCITS and AIFMs, Directive 2013/14/EU states that it is not desirable to rely ‘solely 
and mechanistically’ on credit ratings or use them as the only parameter when assessing the risk 
involved in the investment made by IORPs, UCITS and AIFMs.32 All things considered, it can now 
be said that the regulatory debate on over-reliance was prompted by the FSB and developed into a set 
of principles that the FSB jurisdictions are required to translate into their own legislation and 
implement within a reasonable timeframe. These principles fix the approach against over-reliance.  
 To complete the analysis, it must be underlined that the FSB approach does not pursue a total 
elimination of the credit ratings from legislation, rather only the elimination of those credit rating 
references which can induce over-reliance.33 For this reason, regulatory reliance on credit ratings is 
not to be eliminated but reduced to eliminate the problem of over-reliance by investors and market 
participants.  
 
4. Credit Rating References in Guidelines, Recommendations and Draft Technical 
Standards 
 
4.1.The ESAs review under Article 5(b) of CRA Regulation III 
 
The European regulators have made a full endorsement of the FSB approach by setting out specific 
rules in CRA Regulation III. As mentioned above, Article 5(b) of CRA Regulation III mandates that 
the ESAs conduct a stocktaking review of the credit rating references in their guidelines, 
recommendations and draft technical standards. The ESAs completed their review and issued their 
                                                          
29 Art 5(c) of CRA Regulation III, see also Recital No 6 of CRA Regulation III which anticipates the 
contents of Art 5(c). 
30 Art 5(a) of CRA Regulation III. 
31 Directive 2013/14/EU, (2013) OJ (L145/1). 
32 See Recital No 2 of Directive 2013/14/EU. 
33 FSB Principle I: ‘it is particularly pressing to remove or replace such references where they lead to 
mechanistic responses by market participants’. 
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result in the first half of 2014. Accordingly, a critical assessment can be made in relation to the 
purpose of the present investigation, that is, whether the use of the credit ratings by the European 
regulators carry the risk of over-reliance as defined above.34 In their stocktaking review, the ESAs 
underlined that the Commission gave them the mandate to identify references which can induce 
mechanistic reliance on external credit ratings without providing any definition of mechanistic 
reliance.35 Clearly, the ESAs’ review could not take place without a preliminary clarification of what 
mechanistic reliance is. Consequently, their first task was to set out a definition of mechanistic 
reliance to facilitate the identification of the credit rating references which can carry such a risk. 
According to the final draft of the consultation paper on the enactment of Article 5(b) of CRA 
Regulation III issued in 2014, the definition of mechanistic reliance reads as follows: ‘it is considered 
that there is sole or mechanistic reliance on credit ratings (or credit rating outlooks) when an action 
or omission is the consequence of any type of rule based on credit ratings (or credit rating outlooks) 
without any discretion’. The ESAs clarified that such a definition can be traced back to the preparatory 
works which finally led the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of Europe (the 
European Institutions) to finalise the last piece of European legislation on CRAs.36 In practice, this 
definition is the result of the understanding reached by the European Institutions during the 
negotiation of CRA Regulation III. However, such an understanding has never been translated into a 
specific definition. The definition of mechanistic reliance provided by the ESAs can be considered as 
a summary of the broader definition of over-reliance which was provided in the second section of this 
paper by contrasting two sectors at risk of over-reliance. In their definition the ESAs emphasise the 
negligent conduct of investors and market participants in performing their own due diligence and 
credit assessment when they give prominence to credit ratings as credit risk assessment tools. Such 
conduct can exacerbate cliff-edge effects and parallel behaviours on the part of other investors and 
market participants. While the ‘action’ indicated in the definition refers indeed to these phenomena, 
the ‘omission’ is to be referred to as the lack of any credit risk assessment complementary to the 
analysis provided by the CRAs. This gives the credit ratings the exclusivity and primacy as a means 
for assessing credit risk. Even though there is no explicit reference to the misperception of credit 
ratings as an official seal of approval of creditworthiness, the ESAs’ definition is, in any case, in 
relation to the negligent conduct of investors and market participants which connotes the type of over-
reliance stemming from the hardwiring of credit ratings in legislation and regulatory frameworks. 
Finally, the ESAs underlined that regulations based on external credit ratings are the source of the 
problems at hand.37  
 Their definition constitutes the standard upon which the three authorities could perform and 
complete their review. In practice, through their definition of mechanistic reliance their work could 
have easily selected specific credit rating references in their recommendations, guidelines, and draft 
technical standards. This, in turn, could have guaranteed compliance with the letter of Article 5(b) 
and with the rationale behind FSB Principle I. Accordingly, the following discussion is based on the 
results of their review.  
 
4.2.The EBA’s review 
 
The EBA’s assessment referred to the guidelines on the recognition of External Credit Assessment 
Institutions (ECAI) that the authority issued in 2010.38 Within these guidelines, those concerning the 
                                                          
34 EBA, EIOPA and ESMA (ESAs), Final Report on Mechanistic References to Credit Ratings in the ESA’s 
Guidelines and Recommendations, JC 2014-004 (2014). 
35 ESAs, Joint Consultation Paper on Mechanistic References to Credit Ratings in the ESA’s Guidelines and 
Recommendations, JC-CP-2013-02 (2013). 
36 ESAs, supra note 34. 
37 Id. 
38 The guidelines were intended to provide consistency across jurisdictions on the External Credit 
Assessment Institutions (ECAI) recognition for the determination of capital requirements under the SA and 
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mapping to external ratings in the standardised approach (SA) and the mapping for securitisation 
exposures came under the EBA spotlight with regard to the risk of mechanistic reliance. To have a 
better understanding of this, some preliminary explanations are in order.  
 Under the Basel II capital adequacy framework, banking institutions are allowed to use the 
SA and, thus, rely on external credit ratings to calculate the capital requirements for credit risk. At 
the EU level, the Basel II framework and its SA were subsequently transposed into the CRD 
legislation comprising Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC. The SA was retained in the new Basel 
III framework as well as in the recent CRD IV legislation comprising Regulation EU No 575/2013 
(CRR) and Directive 2013/36/EU (CRD).39 Taking position from the first source, that is, the Basel II 
framework, Annex 2 identifies the mapping process as the correspondence between the credit risk 
assessment to risk weights determined by an eligible ECAI under the SA, and the credit quality steps 
(CQS). What this means is that once a rating agency is eligible to be recognised as an ECAI its credit 
assessments are mapped by supervisors to the CQS defined by the Basel II framework. As is known, 
the framework also determines the risk weight (amount of capital) to be applied to each exposure. 
The banking supervisory authorities are responsible for the mapping process and, as specified in 
Annex 2, they have to consider a variety of qualitative and quantitative factors to differentiate between 
the relative degrees of risk expressed by each assessment, including, inter alia, the pool of issuers that 
each agency covers, the range of ratings that an agency assigns, each rating’s meaning and each 
agency’s definition of default.40 In relation to Annex 2 of the Basel II framework, Article 82 of CRD 
III specifies that the competent authorities shall determine, in an objective and consistent manner, 
with which of the CQS set out in Directive 2006/48/EC the credit assessment provided by ECAI are 
to be mapped.41  
 The 2010 EBA guidelines were issued in the context of such rules and principles with the 
view to setting out a common approach to mapping and hence ensuring consistency across the EU to 
reduce the risk of regulatory arbitrage.42  With regard to the use of external credit ratings and their 
mapping under the SA, the EBA underlined that CQS may change in the event of rating downgrades. 
In turn, this will determine an increase in the capital requirements. The EBA identifies this situation 
as an example of mechanistic reliance because institutions cannot rely on risk assessment tools 
alternative to credit ratings.43 Similar conclusions were drawn in relation to the mapping process for 
securitisation exposures. Therefore, the EBA was able to identify what, in its view, can be the source 
of mechanistic reliance on external credit ratings and should be accordingly repealed under Article 
5(b) of CRA Regulation III.44  
 However, what causes debate is not the identified guidelines but how the EBA decided to 
react. In other words, the EBA’s justification for why it feels it is not opportune to apply any 
amendment. To begin with, there are technical reasons. These can be traced back to the forthcoming 
implementing technical standards (ITS) specifying the mapping of ECAIs to CQS which the EBA 
have the task of drafting under the CRR. The ITS will automatically amend the guidelines. 
Consequently, any amendment before the issuance of the ITS would not make sense.45 Secondly, the 
                                                          
in relation to the securitisation ratings-based approach, see EBA, Revised Guidelines on the Recognition of 
External Credit Assessment Institutions (2010).  
39 ‘Regulation 575/2013, 2013 OJ (L176/1); see also Directive 2013/36/EU, 2013 OJ (L176/338). 
40 BCBS, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, A revised Framework 
Annex 2 Standardized Approach-Implementing the Mapping Process (2006); see also BCBS, The 
Standardised Approach to Credit Risk, Supporting Document to the New Basel Capital Accord (2001). 
41 See Directive 2010/76/EC, 2010 OJ (L329/3). 
42 EBA, supra note 38. 
43 ESAs, supra note 34 . 
44 Id. 
45 ESAs, Consultation Paper on Draft Implementing Technical Standards on the mapping of ECAIs’ credit 
assessments under Article 136(1) and (3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirement Regulation-
CRR), JC/CP/2014/01 (2014). 
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EBA questions its authority to apply the amendments requested by the letter of Article 5(b). 
Interestingly, the EBA argues that the risk of over-reliance stems primarily from the SA rather than 
exclusively from its guidelines. Next, this risk may continue through the implementing legislation, 
namely the CRD III and IV. In this context, it is the task of the Basel Committee Task Force on the 
SA to find appropriate alternatives for the mapping to external credit ratings in the approach and for 
securitisation exposure. This would allow a change in the implementing legislation and possibly new 
guidelines in accordance with it.46  
 Furthermore, the EBA underlines that any amendments to its guidelines cannot have any effect 
on the implementing legislation, namely the CRR. In practice, guidelines and recommendations 
issued by the ESAs cannot repeal any legislation and, thus, the EBA feels that it is not opportune to 
take any steps. These are the legal reasons which prevent the EBA from fully complying with Article 
5(b). Based on this, it can be observed that, at least for the EBA, the mandate set out in Article 5(b) 
has remained on paper or has been left unrealised. The message from the EBA appears to be clear: 
the forthcoming ITS will take into consideration the risk of over-reliance. However, what is indicated 
as essential is the elaboration of alternatives to external credit ratings. In this respect, the problem 
may be not only the objective difficulty in finding accepted alternatives but also the willingness on 
the part of the Basel arena to discuss the possibility of finding alternatives as substitutes to the credit 
ratings. Significantly, the EBA’s room for manoeuvre seems to be very limited, even though it 
identified some references to credit ratings which may induce mechanist reliance. Its justifications 
with regard to the opportunity of not applying any changes to its guidelines is logical in relation to 
the fact that any change should come first from the source upon which the European legislation on 
capital requirements is based, that is, the Basel framework. This would permit the EBA to issue new 
guidelines or ITS for the finalisation of new bodies of rules that the EU competent institutions would 
elaborate on in accordance with the Basel soft-law rules.  
 
4.3.The ESMA’s review 
 
The ESMA performed its review in relation to the 2010 CESR’s guidelines providing a definition of 
money market funds.47 When they were issued, the guidelines were aimed at ensuring investors’ 
protection through a harmonised definition of money market funds. The guidelines drew a line 
between short-term money market funds (STMMFs) and money market funds (MMFs).48 With regard 
to over-reliance, Boxes 2 and 3 of the ESMA’s guidelines, relating respectively to STMMFs and 
MMFs, came under scrutiny.  
 According to the ESMA, references to external credit ratings in Boxes 2 and 3 can create 
undue reliance on the part of asset managers. In point 3 of box 2 it is stated that STMMFs have to 
invest in debt instruments which are of a high quality. The determination of ‘high quality’ is the task 
of the management company and, to this end, the guidelines specify that a wide range of factors can 
be taken into account, among them: (a) the credit quality of the instrument; (b) the nature of the asset 
class represented by the instrument; (c) the operational and counterparty risk when it is a structured 
finance transaction; and (d) the liquidity profile.49 Based on these factors, attention must be paid to 
the credit quality of the debt instrument. In this respect, paragraph 4 of the guideline associates the 
credit quality requirement to the highest credit rating category awarded by recognised CRAs. Such a 
requirement operates in the event of credit rating being provided by CRAs, otherwise an equivalent 
                                                          
46 ESAs, supra note 34. 
47 ESMA, CESR’s Guidelines on a Common Definition of European Money Market Funds, CESR/10-049 
(2010). 
48 Id, while STMMFs are allowed to invest in securities with a residual maturity of less than, or equal to, 397 
days and have a portfolio-weighted average maturity that does not exceed 60 days, MMFs are not subjected 
to the same maturity restriction provided that their portfolio-weighted average maturity does not exceed six 
months. 
49 ESAs, supra note 34. 
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quality for an unrated instrument will be determined through the management company’s internal 
rating process. On the other hand, as to MMFs, paragraph 2 of Box 3 states that MMFs may hold 
sovereign issuance provided that it is of investment grade quality.50 
Paragraph 4 of Box 2 and paragraph 2 of Box 3 of the ESMA guidelines have been the subject 
of review. The changes applied by the ESMA stimulate the following reflections. Both paragraphs 
have been re-worded in such a way as not to give exclusivity to the external credit ratings to the 
detriment of other factors that the management company should consider for the determination of 
credit quality.51 Such an amendment would have made sense if there had not been any warnings in 
the guidelines as to the necessity of avoiding giving primacy to external credit ratings for the 
determination of credit quality. In reality, these warnings were already present in the explanatory 
notes included in the 2010 ESMA’s guidelines: ‘in carrying out its diligence, the management 
company should not place undue weight on the credit rating of the instrument’.52 Additionally, the 
explanatory text encouraged the monitoring of the credit quality of the money market instruments on 
an ongoing basis and not only at the moment of the purchase. Significantly, in the event of rating 
downgrades, corrective actions should be taken into consideration by the management company in 
the best interests of the clients.53   
These explanatory notes were already mitigating the potential risk of over-reliance which, 
according to the ESMA’s 2014 review, would stem from paragraph 4 of Box 2 and paragraph 2 of 
Box 3. Based on this, it may be argued that there was no need for intervention on this guideline. This 
raises the question of whether the 2010 CESR’s guidelines on European MMFs could really carry the 
risk of over-reliance as claimed by the ESMA. The answer could be positive in the absence of 
mitigating warnings, but given that the warnings were already set out in the guidelines, the answer 
may be negative. For these reasons, the applied amendments appear to be a re-formulation of a set of 
guidelines which did not appear, per se, to carry the risk of over-reliance due to the fact that asset 
managers were warned not to give exclusivity to the credit ratings for credit risk assessment.  
 
5. The Risk of Over-reliance in EU Financial Law 
 
The EIOPA has not identified any recommendations or guidelines which contain credit rating 
references posing a risk of mechanistic reliance.54 The outcomes of the ESA’s reviews, in particular 
the ESMA’s and EIOPA’s review, raise some questions that apply to the investigation that the 
Commission is expected to complete by 2020 under Article 5(c) of CRA Regulation III. The contents 
of this rule are not dissimilar to those in Article 5(b) involving the ESAs. The only difference is found 
in the broadest term assigned to the Commission to conduct its review. The Commission will have to 
review and identify those credit ratings references in EU law which can cause undue reliance and, by 
January 2020, repeal them, provided that valid alternatives are found. Since it has been mentioned 
that the EIOPA did not find any credit rating references in its guidelines, and while it has been argued 
that the ESMA guidelines do not carry, per se, any risk of over-reliance, it is worthwhile to discuss 
the extent to which the Commission’s review of the credit rating references in EU law might lead to 
the same results. To this end, it is necessary to investigate the hardwiring of credit ratings into EU 
                                                          
50 Id. 
51Id, at 17: ‘Where one or more credit rating agencies registered and supervised by ESMA have provided a 
rating of the instrument, the management company’s internal assessment should have regard to, inter alia, 
those credit ratings. While there should be no mechanistic reliance on such external ratings, a downgrade 
below the two highest short-term credit ratings by any agency registered and supervised by ESMA that has 
rated the instrument should lead the manager to undertake a new assessment of the credit quality of the 
money market instrument to ensure it continues to be of high quality’. 
52 See ESMA supra note 47. 
53 Id. 
54 See ESAs, supra note 34, at 13: ’EIOPA has not identified any guidelines, in force or currently under 
development, to be used as an example of mechanistic reliance’.  
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law. In practice, it must be assessed the role of credit ratings in the EU’s legislation before the ongoing 
reforms which took place in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. This will fulfil the 
purpose of the present analysis, that is, to assess the extent to which credit ratings are embedded in 
EU law and whether such references confer a primacy status to credit ratings in such a way as to be 




Starting with the banking sector it must be observed that the CRD, in its early framework, already 
provided some incentives for more internal risk analysis so as to counterbalance the use of external 
credit ratings. Firstly, the possibility of using the IRB approach, per se, acted as an incentive to 
perform more independent credit risk assessments since, as the Commission stressed ‘the CRD 
requires credit institutions to have their own sound credit granting criteria and credit decision 
processes in place. Basing rating decisions solely on external credit rating agency ratings does not 
fulfil this requirement under the EU banking legislation’.55 Secondly, it is worth noting that Annex 
VII, part 4, item 18 of the earlier framework stated that if a credit institution uses external ratings as 
primary factors determining an internal rating assignment, the credit institution shall ensure that it 
considers other relevant information.56 Therefore, external ratings could be used as primary factors 
for determining an internal rating but not as exclusive benchmarks. They had to be complemented 
with other information.  
 Considering that both the early and new CRD frameworks incorporated incentives for 
autonomous credit risk analysis, references to credit ratings do not seem, ipso facto, to pose serious 




The early EU framework on the supervision of insurance and reinsurance undertakings did not contain 
any provision referring to credit ratings. 57 Recently, this regime has been amended through the 
introduction of Directive 2009/138/EC (the so-called Solvency II framework directive), which 
introduces risk-oriented solvency requirements for insurance and reinsurance undertakings. Solvency 
II deals with credit risk, and capital requirements are calculated either through a standard formula or 
through the undertaking’s internal model which is subject to supervisory approval.58 There are no 
references to external credit ratings in the Solvency II framework. However, on 10 October 2014 the 
Commission issued a Delegated Act containing implementing rules for Solvency II.59 In greater 
detail, Commission Delegated Regulation 2015/35 refers to the credit ratings provided by ECAI. 
Article 4 states that insurance and reinsurance undertakings may use external credit ratings for the 
calculation of the solvency capital requirements in accordance with the standard formula only when 
they have been issued by an ECAI or endorsed by an ECAI under CRA Regulation I. Nonetheless, 
Regulation 2015/35 takes into consideration the risk of over-reliance on credit ratings by specifying 
that they cannot be regarded as exclusive parameters for the purposes of calculating capital 
requirements.60 Consequently, the new regulation implementing the Solvency II framework is in line 
with the FSB principles and, in theory, should not pose any over-reliance threat.  
                                                          
55 Commission Impact Assessment, supra note 27. 
56 See Directive 2006/48/EC, 2006 OJ (L 177/1). 
57 See Articles 27 to 31 of Directive 2002/83/EC, 2002 OJ (L345/1); Article 1 of Directive 2002/13/EC, 2002 
OJ (L77/17); and Articles 37 to 39 of Directive 2005/68/EC, 2005 OJ (L323/1). 
58 See Articles 100 to 127 of Directive 2009/138/EC (Solvency II), 2009 OJ (L 335). 
59 Commission, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/35 of 10 October 2014 supplementing 
directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the taking-up and pursuit of the 
business of Insurance and Reinsurance OJ L 12/3 (2014). 






Similar conclusions apply to the pension sector. In the EU, pension funds are regulated under the 
Institution for Occupational Retirement Provision Directive (IORP).61 This directive does not contain 
any reference to credit ratings. As already stressed by the EIOPA, this a sector in which legislation 




In the EU the area of collective investment schemes covers four types of harmonised investment 
funds: Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS); Alternative 
Investment Fund Managers (AIFM); European Venture Capital Funds (EuVECA); and European 
Social Entrepreneurship Funds (EuSEF). As mentioned above, the UCITS Directive 2009/65/EC and 
AIFM Directive 2011/61/EU have been amended by Directive 2013/14/EU in relation to the risk of 
over-reliance. However, with specific regard to UCITS, it can be noticed that even before the current 
legislation credit ratings were not the exclusive tools for assessing credit risk. In this respect, reference 
is to be made to Directive 2007/16/EC implementing Council Directive 85/611/ECC on the 
coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to UCITS as regards the 
clarification of certain definitions. 62  For instance, Article 6 listed the criteria for assessing the 
eligibility of non-listed money market instruments issued by ‘an establishment which is subject to, 
and complies with, prudential rules considered by competent authorities to be as stringent as those 
laid down by community law’. In essence, this provision set out four, non-cumulative, criteria to be 
met by a money market instrument to be eligible for an investment by a UCITS. The third of these 
criteria requires the issuer of said instrument to obtain ‘at least investment grade rating’.63 It is 
submitted that such a provision only identified an instrument as being ‘eligible’ for investment but 
not ‘suitable’ and therefore it was not to be regarded as encouraging excessive reliance to the 
detriment of one’s own risk analysis.64 Furthermore, Article 10 referred to credit ratings to determine 
whether transferable securities or money market instruments included a derivative component. 
According to Article 10, one of the non-cumulative criteria to be used to verify whether the host 
security (money market instrument) embedded a derivative was whether the performance of the 
money market instrument was sensitive to changes in the credit rating of the underlined index or 
asset.65 As in Article 6, credit ratings were just one criterion. Asset managers were neither limited 
nor discouraged from conducting their own risk analysis.  
 Considering the recent amendments applied to the UCITS and AIFM directives, which include 
the principle to reduce over-reliance through the encouragement of independent credit risk analysis, 
the outcomes in this sector are not dissimilar to those relating to the CRD framework. There was 




With regard to investment firms, it is worth mentioning the debate as to the credit rating reference 
incorporated in Article 18 of Directive 2006/73/EC implementing Directive 2004/39/EC (MIFID I). 
Article 18 requires qualifying money market funds (QMMF) to invest in high quality money market 
instruments to achieve their primary investment objective which is to maintain the net asset value of 
                                                          
61 Directive 2003/41/EC, 2003, OJ (L 235/10). 
62 Directive 2007/16/EC, 2007 OJ (L79/11). 
63 Id. 
64 Commission Impact Assessment, supra note 27. 
65 OJ (L79/11), supra note 62.   
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the undertaking either constant at par (net of earnings) or at the value of the investor’s initial capital 
plus earnings. Under this rule, high money market instruments are those which receive the highest 
credit ratings by competent CRAs.66 An instrument not rated by any competent CRA shall not be 
regarded as a high quality one.  
 This reference to credit ratings was controversial. It was argued that the requirement could 
potentially exclude all UCITS money market funds which did not rely on specific credit ratings in 
their investment process from the market of managing investment firms’ clients money. 67  
Specifically, the risk was that a money market fund could be excluded from becoming a QMMF when 
it did not rely on competent CRAs but conducted its own risk analysis sufficient to demonstrate that 
the instrument carried an acceptable level of risk.68 Significantly, the rule appeared to give undue 
primacy to the credit ratings. Nonetheless, contrariety was expressed with regard to amending the 
credit rating reference on the grounds that: ‘an independent credit rating protects investors by limiting 
the fund’s ability to chase higher yields through riskier securities based on the fund manager’s own 
subjective assessment’.69 Hence, the elimination of the credit rating reference from Article 18 of the 
MIFID would have hampered the possibility for money market fund investors to rely on a common 
standard for investment quality. Accordingly, it was suggested that only the requirement to refer to 
‘competent CRAs’ would be eliminated, but ultimately there were no changes. However, it must be 
noticed that MIFID I will be repealed and recast by Directive 2014/65/EU and Regulation 600/2014 
(so-called MIFID II), which the Commission issued in July 2014. Both the directive and regulation 
do not contain references to credit ratings.70   
 
5.6.Disclosure requirements for securities 
 
References to credit ratings are also included in the EU rules governing the publishing of a prospectus 
when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading on a regulated market. Annex V of 
Regulation 809/2004 implementing the Prospectus Directive 2003/71/EC lists the information that 
the prospectus should include with regard to the securities being offered or admitted to trading.71 To 
this end, Paragraph 7.5 of Annex V requires an indication the credit ratings assigned to an issuer or 
its debt securities at the request of, or with the cooperation of, the issuer in the rating process. If the 
rating provider has previously published an explanation of the meaning of the ratings, this should also 
be included according to Paragraph 7.5.72 These rules simply refer to instruments which received 
their solicited credit ratings. Nonetheless, there are no references imposing the use of external credit 
ratings as an eligibility condition for the security offering. Credit ratings are simply mentioned among 
the information to be written in the prospectus. Accordingly, such a reference cannot be identified as 
carrying the risk of sole and mechanistic reliance on external credit ratings. 
 
6. Appraising the Regulators’ Use of Credit Ratings in EU Law 
 
The result of the ESAs’ review work, as well as the analysis of the hardwiring of credit ratings in EU 
law, drew attention to the following outcomes: either there are no credit rating references or credit 
ratings are not used as the exclusive benchmarks for assessing credit risk because of explicit warnings 
                                                          
66 See Directive 2006/73/EC, 2006 OJ (L 241/26). 
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68 Id.  
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70 See Directive 2014/65/EU (recast), 2014 OJ (L 173/349); see also Regulation (EU) 600/2014, 2014 OJ (L 
173/84). 




to this end. Importantly, such outcomes should not be referred to the post-crisis reforms of the EU’s 
financial legislation which, inter alia, addressed the issue of over-reliance, but mainly to the pre-crisis 
legislation. Therefore, before the post-crisis reforms there was already a conscious use of credit 
ratings by European regulators. These were among several factors to be taken into consideration for 
assessing credit risk. Significantly, no exclusivity to the credit ratings was given by the European 
regulators. Based on this, it can be concluded that there was no risk of over-reliance deriving from 
the inclusion of credit ratings in EU law. However, it may be objected that the EBA identified this 
risk in some of its guidelines. In this respect, it must be emphasised that the banking sector has always 
been earmarked as the one which boasts the most pervasive use of credit ratings because of the 
reference to them under the SA of the Basel framework.73 From a European perspective, this can be 
noticed in the Capital Adequacy Directive and the Banking Directives of 2006 which ultimately 
implemented the Basel II framework and its SA approach. However, it must be observed that the 
2006 Capital Adequacy Directive constituted the enlargement of the earlier 1993 Capital Adequacy 
Directive which first pioneered the regulatory use of credit ratings in the European Banking 
Regulation. From that moment until the issuance of the 2006 directives, almost all the EU Member 
States referred to credit ratings in their prudential supervision of banks in order to define eligible debt 
securities for the calculation of the capital requirements for specific interest rate risk.74 Nonetheless, 
as mentioned, the earlier EU CRD framework already had incentives for the use of internal systems 
so as to conduct an analysis of creditworthiness not exclusively based on the credit ratings. 
Accordingly, even in the sector in which credit ratings are most often used, the European regulators 
tried to strike an appropriate balance between the use of internal and external means of assessing 
credit quality. This approach was also maintained in the other pieces of primary or secondary EU 
legislation in which references to credit ratings were included.  
 In comparison to other legal systems in which credit ratings can be considered as being 
regarded so hardwired that they have been finally used as exclusive tools for credit risk analysis, this 
is a significant difference. For instance, in the US, the Banking Act of 1936 marked a first in the use 
of credit ratings in legislation, while in the 1970s the so-called Net Capital Rule paved the way for 
the widespread use of credit ratings which has since led to the characterisation of the US as the country 
with the highest rate of use of credit ratings in legislation, regulation and supervisory policies.75 This 
explains the amendments that the US federal agencies are required to apply to their own legislation 
according to the letter and spirit of section 939A of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Consumers Protection 
Act.76 The approach to credit ratings under section 939A sounds harsh vis-à-vis the approach set out 
in European CRA Regulation III. In fact, while the US federal agencies are required to review, remove 
and replace credit rating references with valid alternatives,77 the ESAs and the Commission are 
required to identify only those credit rating references which may induce mechanistic reliance. This 
demonstrates the different ways of referring to credit ratings by the US and EU regulators. In other 
words, if the European regulators aim at selecting only those credit rating references which cause 
undue reliance by investors and market participants, this means that credit ratings will still be retained 
in legislation where necessary. This also means that their presence in legislation was equilibrated to 
the extent that the users of credit ratings were incentivised to take them as complementary, and not 
as unique, sources of information. This approach was pursued in EU law even prior to the post-crisis 
regulatory debate on the CRAs in which the phenomenon of over-reliance was highlighted.  
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 All things considered, the risk of mechanistic reliance deriving from the credit rating 
references in the EU’s financial legislation does not seem to be extreme. Finally, in the context of the 
present discussion it should be mentioned that the risk of over-reliance might be concrete in the event 
that exclusivity to credit ratings was given in the Member States’ domestic legislation implementing 
the European directives. However, the current stance towards the elimination of this risk and the 
incentive to use the credit ratings as one among several factors to assess credit risk should be the 
impetus for framing appropriate implementing legislation at the national level. In any case, there are 
sufficient elements to affirm that the use of the credit ratings in the EU’s financial legislation was 
either marginal or absent. Where references were made, these found an adequate counterbalance in 




The credit rating references in EU law do not carry the risk of over-reliance. This conclusion can be 
drawn from the three results that the present analysis has found. Specifically, it has been shown that 
some pieces of legislation do not contain credit rating references while others refer to the credit ratings 
as being among several factors to be taken into consideration in credit risk analysis, while others still 
provide explicit warnings not to rely exclusively on credit ratings as substitutes for one’s own 
independent credit risk assessment and due diligence. This approach to credit ratings characterised 
the EU’s financial legislation even before the 2007-2009 financial crisis and is currently being 
strengthened as a result of the post-crisis reforms. Despite this conclusion, the review work that the 
Commission will complete in accordance with its timescale remains to be seen. Finding valid 
alternatives to credit ratings is also part of the work of the Commission once it has identified and 
removed those credit rating references which may induce mechanistic reliance.78 Identifying valid 
alternatives to credit ratings is a challenging task. Nonetheless, this could be avoided should the 
Commission conclude that credit rating references in EU law do not pose a serious risk of over-
reliance. However, it will be interesting to analyse any possible reference that the Commission may 
consider as posing a risk of over-reliance. However, there is a high degree of subjectivity in this case. 
At the beginning, it was highlighted that the phenomenon of over-reliance was introduced but not 
clearly defined. This was a real issue since the ESAs had finally to set a definition in order to start 
their review work. In the event that the Commission identifies some critical credit rating references 
in EU law, it will have to base it on the definition of mechanistic reliance provided by the ESAs in 
order to remove and replace them with possible alternatives. To what extent can those who are 
regarded as being at risk of over-reliance, that is to say, the users of credit ratings agree with the 
Commission’s choice? To what extent do the users of credit ratings agree with the assertion that they 
may over-rely on them? This will be a matter for further discussion in accordance with the results of 
the Commission’s review. At this stage, it appears that the EU regulators did not over-emphasise 






                                                          
78 The Commission is expected to submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council by the end of 
2015. This should update on the steps to be taken for the deletion of credit rating references provided that 
valid alternatives to credit ratings are found. See, Directorate General Internal Market and Services 
(DGIMS), EU Response to the Financial Stability Board (FSB)-EU Action Plan to Reduce Reliance on 
Credit Rating Agency (CRA) Ratings, Staff Working Paper (May 2014); See also Andreas Horsch, 
Regulation of Credit Rating Companies: An Economic Point of View, 25 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 2, 227 (2014). 
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